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This paper examines organizational change programs across aviation, healthcare, and financial services sectors.
Based on the analysis of three key programs, a theoretical model, which could be used to describe the state of any
organizational change program, is presented. This model is called the STL Model and is represented by three
mutually perpendicular axes: scalability, transferability, and longevity. In simplest terms, scalability refers to
“volume;” greater the volume of users of, or participants in, a particular change program, the greater the scalability
of that change program. Transferability refers to the number of user-groups, whether within a specific discipline or
outside. Longevity is the measure of how long a particular change program is in operation or existence. Although
longevity alone does not necessitate progress along the scalability and transferability axes, it does provide an
opportunity for improved scalability and transferability. It is hypothesized that certain factors, called “influence
vectors” could be managed to improve the overall sustainability of organizational change programs.
Background
Literature on organizational learning underscores the
importance of systems thinking in designing and
managing change efforts (cf. Senge, 1990; Senge,
Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, and Smith, 1994; Senge,
Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, Roth, & Smith, 1999).
However, studies addressing the difficulties in
scaling “n of 1” type innovations within an
organization or across multiple organizations have
been limited.
Three examples, one from aviation, one from health
care, and one from financial services, are presented in
the following section. These examples illustrate
specific “n of 1” innovations that the research team
has reported in previous research. Such innovations
or success stories abound in several industry
segments, but most of them never scale high enough
for organization-wide adoption. In this paper, a
theoretical model—called the STL Model—is
presented as a means to characterize the progress of
change programs in terms of scalability,
transferability, and longevity and also to present the
role of “influence vectors” in transforming a
change program into a lasting, institutionalized
cultural change.
Examples from Three Distinct Industries
Example 1: Application of the Concept Alignment
Process in aviation maintenance
The Concept Alignment Process (CAP) was first
adopted by the subject aviation department’s flight
crew in 1995 and subsequently customized by the
maintenance department to suit their needs. CAP is
different from most of the Maintenance Resource

Management (MRM) programs because it focuses on
a behavioral change rather than an attitudinal change.
This program illustrates that an organization need not
change everyone’s safety attitude before expecting a
change in anyone’s behavior. CAP expects all
employees to change their behavior and follow a
prearranged process. Therefore, it does not suffer
from the limitations of the first three generations of
MRM programs: limited success in achieving
behavioral changes, changes lasted for six to twelve
months after the training, and participants’ attitudes
toward the program declined over time (cf. Taylor &
Christensen, 1998; Taylor & Patankar, 2001).
Patankar and Taylor (1999) reported that not all of
the technicians in this organization practiced CAP to
the same extent. For example, some of them
understood the basic protocol, but hesitated to
challenge another person’s concept or to seek
validation. Only a few individuals were observed to
be practicing CAP consistently and to its full
potential (challenging concepts, seeking validation,
identifying causes for ambiguity in information, and
implementing
appropriate
structural/procedural
changes so that the ambiguities are minimized).
Patankar and Taylor also observed that as the
skeptics used the process, they understood it more
clearly; and as their success in effecting
organizational changes grew, their trust in the process
grew. Gradually, they were becoming believers.
Hence, this company was able to cause an attitudinal
change through a behavioral change, rather than the
other way around (as attempted in the previous three
generations of MRM programs).
Example 2: Collaborative Rounds—An
Interdisciplinary Innovation in the Post-surgical
Care of Open-heart Surgery Patients.
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Caring for open-heart surgery patients is a socially
and technically complex endeavor.
Surgeons,
therapists, nurses, pharmacists, social workers, and
many other disciplines must coordinate their
assessments and actions with one another, and with
patients and their families. Depending on treatment
needs, up to fifteen different disciplines may
independently gather information from the patient on
any given day (much of it is redundant), develop a
care plan, and enter the plan into the patient’s
medical chart. The medical chart is typically the
primary means of coordinating the thoughts and
actions of all care providers working with the patient.
Yet, the written record is an imperfect means of
coordinating activity; informational gaps, ambiguous
data entry, changes in patient status and other issues
routinely compel care providers to seek or provide
clarifying information in order to fit together the
patient’s total care plan. This approach is inefficient
and prone to oversights and conflicting actions based
on misunderstandings of the patient’s situation and
uncertainty about the overall plan of care.
In 1999, clinicians concerned with these problems at
an acute care hospital began re-thinking the postsurgical care processes for open-heart surgery
patients. These care providers, eventually known as
the cardiac surgery team, decided that altering the
patterns of interaction and communication would be
integral to improving the processes of care for their
patients. They decided to collaborate, to bring all
disciplines together at the same time each morning,
and to partner with patients and their families in
assessment and care planning (cf. Uhlig, Nason,
Camelio, Kendall, & Brown, 2002).
Adapting team briefing and debriefing strategies
from the air transportation industry, the team
achieved significant reduction in operative morbidity
and mortality, as well as substantial gains in staff and
patient satisfaction. An important feature of the
Concord Collaborative Rounds model was the
deliberate capture, through debriefing, of “systemic
glitches”—deviations from intention (errors) that
could support identification, analysis and intervention
in hazards and error-provoking conditions. Despite
significant reduction in operative morbidity and
mortality and national recognition of this change in
practice as an important safety innovation, this
innovation was not sustained by the organization
following a change in physician leadership.

Example 3: A Change Program in Financial
Services
In 1999, the COO and CIO of the fixed-income
division of a major investment firm recognized that
they were reaching the limits of their current model
of operations. Along with the CEO and other senior
executives, they had started a long-term
organizational change process in the early 1990’s.
When they began, the division had just been
embarrassed by a major error (and resulting loss of
business) that occurred when an investment
professional took “too much risk.” A new CEO was
brought in, and he decided to take significant steps to
“clean up the mess.” The “mess” involved radical
decentralization of the professionals, to the point
where (reportedly) the division had “120
professionals and 120 Information Technology (IT)
systems.” They also had that many approaches to
investment decision-making.
The new CEO began by recruiting two key managers
from the professional side to create more coherence
across the unit. They created an approach called
TAM (“Targeted Active Decision-Making”) that
placed boundaries, or limits, on the range of
acceptable risks for investment decision-making.
This template was vigorously enforced and reduced
variations in professional practice. Next, the CEO
chartered (and the COO led) a redesign of all
workflows related to investment decision-making,
using a reengineering approach. This led to improved
productivity and efficiency, on the one hand, and to
strengthening the lines of business (or “desks”) on
the other. By 1998, the CEO was promoting the third
phase of the change—reconciling the IT systems,
which had remained untouched throughout the
preceding phases. The IT initiative was based on
rationalizing the infrastructure; a key mechanism was
the concept, and principle, of “reusable components.”
The concept was simple but hard to implement. IT
project teams, as well as the overall IT management
team, were tasked with transferring and re-using
“good” components from one team, or line of
business, to another. This was hard for several
reasons: it was unfamiliar; it represented a significant
cultural change for the IT managers, their teams, and
the lines of business they supported; and it meant
overcoming the idea that every line of business is
unique—that is, one cannot (by definition) re-use a
component built for the Bonds desk in a software tool
for the Money Market desk.
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The change effort began with an action science-based
(cf. Argyris, Putman, & Smith, 1985; Argyris, 1992)
approach called action learning (or “Active
Learning” as it was called by the team), using After
Action Reviews of situations and stories from
projects. The research team, led by Dr. BigdaPeyton, used an appreciative inquiry orientation, in
which they began with successes, mapped out the
actions and operating assumptions that led to the
successes, and then (and only then) looked at
“unintended consequence.” (Even then, they began
with unintended positive consequences). From this
starting point, they constructed an “As Is” and a “To
Be” that were, in effect, a picture of the current work
culture and a more desirable (and effective) work
culture that they could create together, and with their
business counterparts. For instance, they agreed that
a key driver of their current culture was the “hero
model”—relying on individual experts to solve
critical problems (Bigda-Peyton & Galor, 1999).
They further agreed that they wanted to create a
culture driven by “shared accountability with
individual excellence.” This and other, similar
drivers became the metrics by which they evaluated
the change program.
The second phase of the intervention used peer
reviews, in-action problem-solving, and surfacing
and using tacit knowledge of the business landscape
and the software development process. The research
team made a breakthrough on the re-usable
component issue; the team got a major win and
gained significant credibility with the business side as
a result. The lead technology architect commented,
“I didn’t know you could solve a technology problem
with a model like this—we didn’t learn this in
software engineering school!” The team also used
the method to solve other key problems, such as the
departure of the lead architect and how to facilitate a
project to solve the problems of a desk that were
notorious for “broken” processes and uneven results.
The team used the approaches to make significant
strides in all of these areas.
In the third phase of the effort, the team engaged the
business side as well as their immediate allies and
partners in the central IT organization. They also did
a parallel project with the central Risk and
Knowledge Management group. In each case, the
work was well received; but after one “handshake”
project, the effort declined. The initiative subsided in
2002, after measurable and significant gains in
innovation, operations effectiveness, customer
satisfaction, and culture shift. The specific reasons
for the erosion of this change program were never
formally investigated. (cf. Bigda-Peyton, 2002).

These examples illustrate the following: (a) change
programs are heavily influenced by their specific
champions and (b) the resistance to change among
field personnel could go as far as a high degree of
professional rejection of persons championing the
change. However, it is not clear what specific
strategies change agents need to employ in the design
and implementation of their programs in order to
increase the probability of institutionalization of
those programs. Additionally, the specific
“incubation time” should be identified for change
programs before their effects are evaluated. Although
similarities and differences in terms of professional,
national, and organizational cultures among
physicians, pilots, and aircraft mechanics have been
reported in past studies (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998;
Taylor & Patankar, 1999), the specific roles of such
cultures in influencing the propagation of an
organizational change program have not been
examined.
The STL Model: Characterization and Analysis of
Organizational Change Programs
Although only three specific cases are described
above, the underlying problems of scalability,
transferability, and longevity seem to be consistent in
many similar cases. These problems are robust—they
seem to exist across sectors and methods of
intervention. Thus, the researchers believe that there
must be some fundamental issues that need to be
addressed. Therefore, it appears that the problems of
scalability (S), transferability (T), and longevity (L)
could be framed in the form of a three-dimensional
model—called the STL Model (see Figure 1)—that
could then be used to assess the success of a previous
intervention (retrospective analysis) or to develop
specific strategies to ensure sustainability of future or
planned change programs (prospective analysis).
The STL Model could allow—for the first time—
researchers, practitioners, and policy makers to view
change programs in terms of three interrelated
dimensions. By bringing scalability, transferability,
and longevity perspectives together, one could begin
to formulate a fresh and integrated view of the
assessment of change. Further, it is postulated that
this view includes new micro-level (individual or
small-group) dimensions that could promote the
understanding of the dynamics of knowledge
transfer/flow during the progression of a change
program and the effect such flows, as well as people
or “nodes in a network” that are responsible for
knowledge transfer, might have on the overall
success of the change program. Finally, the STL
Model could enable tracking of the factors
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contributing to the dissemination (or lack thereof) of
local innovations on a wider scale. In turn, an
enhanced perspective on the assessment of
organizational change could enable the promotion of
the spread of innovation and, in part, help address the
fundamental problem of transfer of innovation.

Figure 1. The STL Model
The Three Axes
Scalability, transferability, and longevity are three
inter-related dimensions that could be expressed
along three mutually perpendicular axes. Clearly, a
change in one of the dimensions could affect the
other two. However, it is important to note that a
certain degree of progress along all three dimensions
is necessary for a change program to achieve the
desired level of sustainability. Therefore, one could
argue that scalability, transferability, and longevity
collectively define the sustainability of a change
program.
In simplest terms, scalability refers to “volume.” The
greater the volume of users of, or participants in, a
particular change program, the greater the scalability
of that change program. For measurement,
researchers could count the number of users and
estimate the program’s scalability.
Transferability refers to the number of different usergroups, whether within or between disciplines. For
example, the transferability of a pre- and post-task
briefing process could be measured in terms of the
number of work groups using the process. As the
number of work groups increases, the transferability
increases. If the transferability goes beyond the
traditional boundaries of an organizational unit, the
change could be expressed in terms of orders of
magnitude—when the briefing process that was first

used in the flight operations department is adopted by
the maintenance department, there is a jump in
transferability by one order of magnitude. If the same
process is adopted by another department, the
transferability of that process will undergo a jump by
another order of magnitude. A multi-order
transferability is possible when that process is
adopted by an entirely different industry such as
healthcare. Obviously, as the transferability
increases, so does the scalability; however, change
along this dimension is most difficult.
Longevity is simply the measure of how long a
particular change program has been in existence.
Longevity alone does not necessitate progress along
scalability and transferability because organizational
silos could keep a certain change program alive and
hidden for a long time. Nonetheless, longevity does
provide an opportunity for improved scalability and
transferability. From another perspective, a certain
degree of longevity is essential for an innovation to
be visible outside of a particular organizational unit.
Furthermore, for a bi-directional transfer to take
place, the innovation has to last in the originating
organization long enough for the new organization to
adopt it, demonstrate the advantages, and report
unique, applicable findings back to the original
organization.
The Influence Vectors
The influence vectors are specific individual or
organizational factors such as participant attitudes,
management tenure, regulatory requirements, labormanagement relationship, etc. that have a significant
influence on the lifecycle of a particular change
program. Such factors are called “vectors” because
they have a magnitude and a direction: magnitude is
quantified via opinion or attitude scales, or by
quantitative archival evidence; direction is defined by
the effect of that factor on the change program—if
the effect is beneficial, the direction is positive. Also,
it must be noted that a particular influence vector is
likely to impact all three dimensions, and its
influence may vary. For example, the tenure of a
manager, measured in terms of years, may have a
positive influence on the change program and thereby
boost its longevity. The positive effects of such
longevity (linear scale) might actually cause
exponential changes on the transferability and
scalability dimensions. Survey questionnaires and
archival data analysis could be used to determine the
key influence vectors in a particular industry
segment. It is then plausible that influence vectors
could be managed to drive specific change programs
to their intended level of institutionalization.
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The Culture Change Threshold
Differences in national, organizational, and
professional cultures in aviation and health care have
been reported (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Taylor &
Patankar, 1999). Similarly, the role of organizational
cultures in safety-critical industries has also been
studied extensively (Reason, 1997; Westrum &
Adamski, 1999). Largely, these studies have focused
on describing the concept of culture or safety culture.
Concurrently, many organizations have elected to
implement system-wide changes; however, because
the current state of knowledge mainly addresses the
definition of culture, it is not clear when such
organizational changes should be declared successful
or when exactly one could declare that there has been a
cultural change. By measuring a particular change
program along three interrelated dimensions, the STL
Model attempts to express the state of the change
accomplished by the specific change program. Based
on the literature that describes failures of various
change programs, one could postulate that cultural
change, as opposed to climatic change, is a long-term
change in behaviors as well as attitudes of the
individuals and it changes organizational structures,
processes, and policies. Such a change eventually
becomes independent of the initiating champion.
Therefore, in all measures, a cultural change is not
likely to relapse. If the state of a particular change
program could be described in terms of scalability (the
number of individuals using it), transferability (the
number of organizational units using it), and longevity
(the total years that it has been in existence), one may
be able to define a three-dimensional threshold beyond
which the change could be considered long-term
enough to be commonly accepted as a cultural change.
Conclusion and Future Directions
In order to thoroughly test the STL Model, both
retrospective as well as prospective analyses are
essential. In the retrospective mode, the
characteristics of previously implemented change
programs—their scalability, transferability, and
longevity need to be quantified. Also, it would be
imperative to study the influence vectors as well as
knowledge transfer nodes, both positive as well as
negative, that affected the final status of the change
program. It is important to conduct prospective
analysis to determine what factors the industry
partners believe would make a significant difference
in the transfer of future innovations. Also, the
prospective analysis allows for a critical window of
opportunity to facilitate the transfer of innovations
across organizational units or industry sectors.

The following hypotheses need to be tested:
• Hypothesis # 1: The state of a change program can
be defined in terms of the three macro-level
dimensions of the STL Model: scalability,
transferability, and longevity.
• Secondary Hypothesis: For each dimension of
the STL Model, there are micro-level influence
vectors that have either a positive or a negative
effect on the development of the corresponding
dimension.
• Hypothesis # 2: Transferability of innovation can
be engineered across organizational units or
disciplinary boundaries through appropriate control
of the influence vectors.
• Secondary Hypothesis: Transfer of innovation is
influenced by nodes in organizational networks
and the presence of a learning culture.
Both hypotheses, and their associated secondary
hypotheses, could be tested in a cycle of data
collection, analysis, and testing as the research
progresses through three possible phases—single
case in each sector, three-to-five cases in each sector,
and seven or more cases in each sector.
Kramer and Sabin (2003) describe three conceptual
phases of organizational learning (generating new
knowledge, creating organizational memory, and
embedding the learning) and present practical activities
that professionals can use to promote learning to
change organizations and influence key outcomes.
Organizational learning techniques such as the After
Action Review (AAR) could be employed to identify
lessons learned from critical experiences (cf. Baird,
Holland, & Deacon, 1999). Learning impediments
described by research participants need be analyzed
using a model developed by Shaw and Perkins (1992)
that categorizes learning barriers in terms of
insufficient capacities to reflect on experiences,
disseminate knowledge, and/or take appropriate action.
The Dimensions of the Learning Organization
Questionnaire (DLOQ) by Marsick and Watkins
(2003) could be used to assess the cultures of
participating organizations. Empirical evidence
demonstrates that the DLOQ measures seven
dimensions (continuous learning, inquiry and dialog,
team learning, empowerment, embedded system,
system connection, strategic leadership) that impact
learning, sustain change, and drive improved
performance (Yang, Watkins, & Marsick, 2004).
In summary, the STL Model seems to offer a
plausible means to characterize organizational change
programs. Empirical research in multiple industries
could be used to test the validity of this model.
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